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THE
Comparative Importance
OF
OUR ACQUISITIONS
FROM
FRANCE in AMERICA.

WITH
REMARKS on a PAMPHLET,
INTITLED,
AN EXAMINATION OF THE
COMMERCIAL PRINCIPLES OF
THE LATE NEGOTIATION IN 1761.

L O N D O N:

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THE

COMPANIES LIMITED

OF THE

INDIAN


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
ARMY

OF

INDIA



THE following Pamphlet was writ, before the Preliminary Articles of Peace were signed, which have since been ratified and communicated to Parliament. They are conformable to the main Scope of the Author's Argument, altho' in some very important Particulars, they exceed his most sanguine Hopes; and he is happy in finding, that his Essay upon what ought to be, is now become, if it hath any Force, a Vindication of Terms actually concluded.



THE
Comparative Importance
OF OUR
Acquisitions from *France*
IN
AMERICA, &c.

THE Distinction between speculative and practical Notions appears to be, that, in the first, abstracted Ideas only are considered ; divested of Circumstances which in Practice are found inseparable from them. They compose the Knowledge of the Ignorant, dictate the Language of the Unthinking, and form the Conduct of rash, superficial and sanguine Men : of all those whose Minds are not sufficient to take in the whole of an Object, whose Fancies skim along the Surface of Things, or whose Passions hurry them towards their
B Object.

Object, without suffering them to descend into Discussions, reserved for the cool and considerate Reasoner.

From these Causes the Ruin of Individuals, the Destruction of Families, and the Desolation of Countries are derived : and they are equally exemplified in all Ranks and Conditions of Men, from the Conqueror of Nations down to the improvident Spendthrift of a private Fortune.

Abstracted Ideas of Victory and Conquest, drew upon *Lewis* the Fourteenth the Resentment and Power of all *Europe* ; led *Charles* the Twelfth of *Sweden* to Defeat and Disgrace on the Plains of *Pultowa* ; and in this War, after exposing the King of *Prussia* to Disasters, from which he could only be extricated by the interposition of un-hoped for Events, may, during its farther Progress, furnish another Example in the House of *Austria*, of the fatal Effects produced by head-long Resentment and blind-fold Ambition. In private Life the Instances are innumerable: He who is smitten for his Sins (descending to the third and fourth Generation) with a Love for Architecture and rural Improvements, will enlarge his Domain by dear Purchases, even
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of controverted Titles, with Money borrowed at high Interest ; and pay the Difference, and maintain the Litigation, out of his ancient Patrimony. He will build from a magnificent Plan, upon an elevated and commanding Situation, extending his Design as the Edifice rises, with some new Ornament, or some additional Convenience; every Thing attended to, except the Means necessary to perfect the whole, or to enjoy it when finished with Ease and Comfort. He improves and builds himself into Want and Bankruptcy, and then commences an Architect and Planner for others. In the World of Politicks, such Schemists make their Appearance every Day; and should their Schemes be executed, could they direct as well as plan for Administration, the Fate of this Nation would be the same as the undone Projector's; and *Great Britain*, exhausted by her Efforts, would be numbered by future Historians among those all-grasping Conquerors, who sunk under the Weight of their own Acquisitions.

Great and rapid as our Successes abroad have been, the Wishes and Expectations of our Projectors at home constantly outstrip them: They grew with, and out-grew every Conquest: *Canada* gained, and with it a compleat Security for our *North-Ameri-*

can Colonies, from every Danger which had ever before been apprehended ; all *Louisiana* must be added, or the *French* will one Day invade us from thence : *Martinico*, *Guadaloupe*, *Marigalante* and the *Granadas* must be kept : nor should we stop here, while *Hispaniola* affords Land enough to supply the *French* with Sugars for all the *European* Markets. *Cuba* opens an easy and defenceless Entrance to the Mines of *Peru* and *Mexico* : *Africa* and the *East-Indies* are ours ; and *France* must renounce every Claim to the smallest Possession in either.

But what are all these without an exclusive Fishery ? *France* may again become a Naval Power. Nor will this be sufficient ; *Delen-daest Carthago*. Our Projectors are learned in ancient History, and they are communicative of their Learning. *Carthage*, they tell us, annihilated at Sea and broken at Land, threatened *Rome* with Ruin. But what sent *Hanibal* into *Italy* ? Shame, Rage, and Despair under oppressive and disgraceful Terms of Peace, rousing the dejected Spirits of his Fellow-Citizens, who in their Turn carried Terror and Dismay into the very Heart of a proud Republick. It is true *Carthage* fell ; and certain Studiers of History

tory are apt to contract dangerous Prejudices in favour of Events, produced by Accidents with every human Probability against them, and to form Maxims upon such for the Imitation of others : Mighty Empires have risen upon Measures which have subverted numberless other States directed by the same Policy ; and by which they themselves, in their progressive Course, have been exposed to probable Ruin. But Success dignifies the Means that procure it, while those that fail are exploded with Contempt. Had *Hanibal* not stopt at *Capua*, his Victories and the Downfall of *Rome* would have produced a Set of Maxims, derived from the condemned Pride of the *Romans*, and the applauded Firmness of *Carthage*. But even in this Instance, the final Consequences of having brought utter Ruin upon an Enemy, are not favourable to the Doctrine of our Speculatists ; after *Carthage* had been blotted from the Face of the Earth, the uncontrolled Power and unbounded Ambition of her Destroyer avenged her Cause : and *Rome*, decked in the Spoils of the World, fell a Victim to the Manes of her Rival.

Whoever supposes that I exaggerate the future extravagant Demands of the most sanguine of the scheming Tribe, and insists, that no Man can ever be so absurd as not to

rest contented with the Possession of what we have already acquired ; let him read (the Task will, indeed, be laborious) what hath been written upon these Subjects : Let him compare the Expectations of those Writers, at the Commencement of this War, with their gradual Increase to the present Day ; and he will be convinced, that the Terms, hoped for now by Multitudes, would then have appeared as wildly chimerical to all, as the total Dissolution of *France* does to the soberest Man among us. Nay, if he will follow the Principles of those who would retain all that *France* hath lost, because the Restitution of any Part may enable her hereafter to hurt us, they lead directly to this Conclusion ; *We never can be safe, without a total Extinction of her Power.*

The Situation of *France*, with respect to us and the other Powers of *Europe* ; her internal Strength, derived from natural and improved Advantages ; a fertile Soil, covered with Eighteen Millions of People, skilled in Manufacture, with an inland Access to many foreign Markets ; are Circumstances which would continue her a great and respectable Power, without a single Possession out of *Europe*, or a single Ship to navigate the Seas.

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But she has still Possessions in *America*; she has still Ships to annoy our Trade; to surprise some of our defenceless Settlements, to alarm our Coasts, and affect our Credit by meditated Invasions; which, however ridiculed, are rendered impracticable only by superior Navies and numerous Armies: Means ill suited (in a permanent System) to the Condition of a commercial Country, already loaded and exhausted by Drains and Burthens, severely felt in every Species of domestick and foreign Commerce.

Further still: *France* is in Alliance with the House of *Austria*, and united with the Branches of her own House; the *Dutch* are under the Awe of her superior Force; and they, and all other Maritime Powers, are under the yet stronger Influence of commercial Interests, which bind them to her, and of commercial Jealousies, which estrange them from us: Every Advantage we gain strengthens those Ties, and inflames those Jealousies. Where must this end? If our Security from *France* can only be obtained by Means which render every other Nation insecure from us; if, to avoid, one Day, being conquered and enslaved, we must attain and preserve the Means of deciding upon the Fate of the rest of Mankind; unhappily
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for *Europe*, and still more unhappily for us, our Situation in the general System is totally altered: We have changed Sides with that Power which we formerly opposed, in conjunction with the World; and the Descendant of *Lewis XIV.* may head a grand Alliance, in a Maritime League, against the *British* Aspirer to universal Monarchy. The *Spaniard* hath already taken the Alarm, and wages open War against us: The *Dutch* have done enough to demonstrate their Disposition to do more: And *Britain*, the ancient Friend of *Europe*, hath scarcely now an Ally who will be hired to stand her Second in a Contest. To such Extremities are we led, by Principles of guarding against every distant and possible Danger, and of obtaining a Security, denied by Nature to every sublunary Power.

Jealousy, inseparable from Liberty, was ever the Characteristic of *Britons*. But it partook of the Source from whence it sprung, and operated in abolishing the Despotism of others, not in establishing it in ourselves. This Disposition hath engaged us in many *preventive* Wars; an Epithet devised to define Measures where Offence could not be avowed, nor Defence from any immediate Attack pretended. But,
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without entering into a Question upon the Justice of those Wars, or the Prudence of those Terms by which they were ended, sure it is, (as sure as any general Proposition can be) that Peace is the State most natural to us; and that not only those Contests in which we ourselves are Principals or Parties, but those which desolate other Countries, are injurious to our Interest. Every Impoverishment of them is the Loss of a Customer to us; for the World is our Market, supplying those Things necessary to us, taking in Return the Fruits of our Industry, and balancing the Difference with their Silver and Gold. Happy beyond the other Nations of *Europe* in our Climate and Soil, in what they give, and what they refuse; while our Abundance, and our Wants, equally co-operate to connect us with the Universe; and make us, as Merchants, what we ought to be as Christians, Friends to Man.

Such hath been that Sameness of Interest, which for Centuries rendered our Country the most favoured by every other. Our Growth was not envied, because we grew by Means beneficial to all. Our Power was not dreaded, because we aimed not at Conquests; and because we employed, for the Defence of our Friends

in War, a Share of that Wealth which we acquired from them in Peace. The Cause of *Europe* was ours: In that we fought, and for that we conquered. Our Blood was spilt, and our Treasures expended, not for Acquisitions to ourselves, but for Security to them; and our most successful Wars ended in Treaties of Peace, which procured little Addition of Territory, valuable in any other View. From hence arises a proverbial Reflection, less just than it is generally conceived to be, that *France*, inferior in the Field, rises superior to us in the Cabinet; and hath often recovered from us by Policy, what she lost by Defeats in Battle. May our Statesmen never vindicate their Abilities from this Reproach, by endeavouring at what cannot be obtained; by grasping what cannot be held; and by rendering our Condition desperate in Peace, by overstrained Efforts in War, protracted beyond a natural and reasonable Period.

Some indeed there are, who appear more moderate in their Ideas of Peace, than those Enthusiasts who would keep all, and conquer still more. They do not positively insist upon all that we are now possessed of; but of these, by far the greater Number would keep enough to render precarious to *France* what is yielded to her, and

to subject the Whole to an absolute Dependence upon our Pleasure. They all define alike a good Peace. It is such as shall disable *France* from hereafter annoying us; which, in other Words, imports a State of Subjection. But, even in that Case, the End of absolute Security would not be obtained; for History swarms with Instances of even Slaves rising upon and destroying their tyrannical Masters. They apprehend, and it cannot be denied, that *France*, recovering Strength, may, in a Course of Years, resume her Arms, and recommence Hostilities against us. But it is equally certain, and it hath been already observed in the Instance of *Carthage*, that hard and injurious Terms of Peace will hasten that Event: And whatever the Issue of another Struggle may be, although still more prosperous than the present; yet, circumstanced as we are, another War, upon the Heels of this, would endanger our Ruin; and small will the Comfort then be to our Beggars and Bankrupts, that *France* is more undone than they.

Men, desperate in their Circumstances, have nothing left worth the managing: They will hazard their last Stake upon a Cast, with the Odds ever so much against them; and those who are affronted in their

Honour proceed upon the same Maxim, and are actuated by a like Impulse. They consider what they have endured, more than any Sufferings to which they may be further exposed; and patient Indurance is the worst Disgrace. Nations feel like the Individuals of which they are composed; and the Success of happy Temerities hath been so frequent in Experience, as to establish a Maxim never wisely to be departed from—*That a vanquished Enemy should not be pushed to the last Extremities.* If we wander into Speculations, and indulge Apprehensions of what *France* may attempt against us, when she shall have recovered a sufficient Force; why shall we refuse to other Nations a like Liberty of speculating upon a nearer Object, and more probable Event; upon the Danger of their being oppressed by those, who insist upon retaining, in their actual Possession, an uncontrolled and resistless Power of oppressing? An intractable Fondness for the Means, is the surest Indication of a purposed End.

But should the Nations of *Europe* remain patient Spectators; should they consider these Consequences as too remote and problematical to engage their Interposition; yet what is there to induce *France* to accept of Terms more prejudicial to her Interest
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and Independency, than even the Continuance of an unsuccessful War, which hath already nearly stripped her of all she can lose in the Prosecution of it? If she is to be deprived of all we can take from her, will she suffer us to enjoy her spoils in Peace without Interruption, and without Expence? Humbled and defeated as she is, *Old France* and *Spain* are still entire: Our Triumphs in *Germany* will not transport us into *Alsace*, or tempt us to pursue our Conquests beyond the *Pirenean* Mountains: Our Superiority by Sea cannot intercept the *French* inland Trade on the Continent of *Europe*; while that Commerce by Sea, which is protected by the Law of Nations, and particular Treaties, will be continued by neutral Powers, even beyond the Bounds allowed in either: Our Commerce will be still exposed to Hazards and Losses, and our Settlements to Surprizes, from which the Vigilance of human Prudence, and the Power of superior Force, cannot at all Seasons, and in all possible Events, secure us through the wide Extent of Possessions scattered over the Face of the whole World; and other Places will be left as unguarded as *Newfoundland* hath always been; or the Expence of necessary Precautions in every Part, will weaken and undo the Whole.

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Our Revenue, increased as it may be by our Conquests, falls so short of the Expences of our Fleets and Armies, that we every Year borrow immense Sums; and while we conquer Abroad, and insist upon retaining our Conquests, Foreign Lenders acquire a Dominion in the very Heart of our Country; and our Lands and Houses become mortgaged to them. They who in Peace supplied us with Money at low Interest, fructifying in Commerce with three-fold Gain to our Merchants, now impose usurious Terms upon our Necessities, for Sums annihilated in the Waste and Consumption of War. Nor is this the whole of our Loss, and of the Benefits derived to them from it: The Burthens, which depress our Trade, furnish them at once with Means and Opportunities of extending theirs at unrivalled Markets. They trade with our Money; and sell, and will continue to sell, upon cheaper Terms than we can afford, prest down by heavy Taxes and high Interest. The Number of our Traders, and the Capital of our Trade are lessened, while our Merchants purchase in our Funds an enormous Gain; securing an Income to Indolence and Ease, beyond the Profits drawn by Industry and Pains from the richest Veins of Commerce. Such are the Effects of even a successful War: Nor will

will they cease with their Cause, although they increase with its Continuance; and Languor and Weakness, although the Fever be removed, prove often mortal to an exhausted Patient.

Fatal as a perpetual War would be, and cruel beyond Barbarism as those Maxims are which lead to the total Extermination of an Enemy; yet in Prudence and Policy there is no safe and practicable Medium between that savage Extreme and Moderation in Prosperity. Treaties upon hard and disgraceful Terms, imposed upon a vanquished Adversary, can only produce a precarious Truce; rendering the same expensive Measures necessary to guard against sudden Attempts, as might be sufficient to carry on War to its final Period. And every Cession, short of reasonable and equitable Terms, made by the Conqueror as a Purchase for such a Peace, far from rendering it more secure, only serves to hasten its Dissolution, by sooner enabling the injured to vindicate his Honour and his Interest.

Every State in *Europe* engaged in War, for at least a Century past, hath sat down with Loss upon the Conclusion of Peace; And if the Contest between *Austria* and *Prussia*,

Prussia, which now desolates *Germany*, can be composed by no other Means than a full Compensation for Expence and Losses, we may pronounce that it never will end but in the total Ruin of one of the Parties; and that another War of thirty Years, may again be the Fate of that unhappy Country where this now rages. But blameable as such an inflexible Obstinacy would be in either of those Powers, how much more inexcusable would it appear in a People, whose Genius and Situation do not incline them to Conquest; whose best Interest is confined to the Defence and Improvement of what they have; who, upon this Principle, become an Overmatch for a Monarchy, by Nature incomparably their Superior; and who, departing from these constitutional Maxims, may, in the Fullness of Time, fall by the same Causes, which had first weakened their vanquished Rival. If such a Country be attacked, she should defend her Rights; she should retaliate for the Injuries she hath received; she should attack in her turn; she should conquer, and retain as much of her Conquests as may serve to secure her old Possessions from probable Assaults; and to make it the permanent Interest of a weakened and discomfited Enemy to remain contented with what her Moderation allows him. This may possibly

fibly afford no inaccurate general Definition of an equal Peace; and such alone can be a good one, or, in other well-known Words, *Safe and Honourable*. A Step farther constitutes the Conqueror panting for Glory, and enamoured of Dominion, under the specious Pretences of Compensation for Injuries, and Security against Dangers: Terms as unlimited as the Desires of those, who assume to themselves the sole Right of defining them.

No Peace can be good that is not lasting. This general Proposition, true in all Conditions, becomes more evident when applied to a Country plunged in Difficulties by War, from which many Years of Peace cannot intirely relieve her. And from the same Principle, in the same Circumstances, a speedy Peace is preferable to one more distant, by the whole Difference of Expence in a Continuance of War: That which would be a good Peace now, would have been better last Year by at least as many Men, and as many Millions, as the War in 1762 hath cost us. And should this be unhappily lengthened to a more distant Period, the same Reasoning will hold in much more than arithmetical Progression. They who consider the Miseries of another

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Nation as the chief Source of our Felicity, and their Weakness as our Strength, who say with respect to the falling *French*, as the Devil did to Man, *Evil be thou my Good*, may not admit this Doctrine. But with all the Glory we have acquired, and the Disgrace, Expence, and Losses, which weaken the Strength, and cloud the ancient Reputation of *France*, I shall venture to assert, as a Friend to my Country, that better it had been if *France* had not driven us to the Necessity of waging War against her.

These Reflections naturally lead to the following Inferences. In our Negotiations with *France*, the greater or less Facility of obtaining certain Objects, should be rated as constituting no inconsiderable Part of their intrinsic Value; and for this plain Reason, because they tend to hasten or protract the Conclusion of Peace, and to prolong or shorten its Duration. What tends to secure our ancient and indisputable Property, should have a Preference, from this Regard, to new Acquisitions more unconnected with, and of more distant Importance to this Object; because such a Conduct will be less invidious to others, most agreeable to our real Interest, and to the Maxims under which we have prospered for

for Ages. And lastly, in our Idea of Benefits, we should not admit that dangerous and inhuman Maxim of negative Advantages to be obtained by Privation and Destruction. Such Notions well fit the Rage of War, and the barbarous Phrenzy of Conquerors laying waste what they cannot enjoy; but would ill accord with the benign Nature of Peace, and with the liberal Genius of those who excel in Industry and Arts, even more than in Atchievements of military Prowess; although these have spread their Fame all over the World: Would it were false to add, and have excited Alarm as wide as Admiration!

In all these Views, and upon every equitable Principle, our Conquests in *North America* present themselves as the first Object; and indeed it seems natural, that in concluding a Peace, we should first turn our Eyes towards that Quarter where the War first arose, and in which the Causes that produced it were laid. The superior Importance of our Acquisitions there, the smaller Expence, and the fewer Hazards to which we shall be exposed in preserving them, are so clearly and amply explained by the Author of *The Interest of Great Britain considered, with regard to her Colonies*;

that an Attempt of saying any thing more upon this Subject would have been superfluous, had not a Pamphlet lately made its Appearance on the other Side of the Question, with much Ingenuity of Argument, and great Elegance of Style, abundantly sufficient to confirm those in their Errors, who were before inclined to the same Opinions, and to encourage and countenance Opposition to the only attainable Terms of Peace. For the Author's humane Disposition (P. 92.) to purchase that greatest of human Blessings with a Part of what we have acquired, will be of little avail, if the Conditions to be offered are such as will not be submitted to. The Effusion of Blood must still continue; and it will continue (if what the Author says be founded, that Expence and Loss in War are near equal on both Sides (P. 93.)) until Terms of Peace be proposed more agreeable to such an Equality, than even his Moderation would dictate.

Voltaire observes, that the Balance of Power amongst belligerent Parties in *Europe* stands so even, that the Wars of this Century have ended with little of Acquisition to either. And however superior our Successes have been, yet while the internal Resources

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of *France* are such as may enable her to bear Losses, which if fallen upon us would e'er now have overwhelmed us, longer than we can supply the Means of supporting a Contest ; whatever our active Force may be, the Solidity of her passive Strength (if I may be allowed the Expression) may at the End prove an Over-match for us. And should that Experiment be tried to the full Extent of Ability in either Nation, one Maxim is incontestably true ; that they will have the Advantage in Peace, who can longest endure the War. Should we then be reduced to offer what the Author would now reject ; he will find (and as an honest Man he will grieve at the Discovery) that *France* holds *Canada* at much a higher Value than he rates it ; and that a favourite Object of her Cares for more than a Century, will resume its wonted Rank in the Councils of that Monarchy. When *France* had no Purpose to serve but that of Acquisition ; when she could not mean to exaggerate the Importance of *Canada*, that it might appear to us a more valuable Cession ; (as she did not mean to cede it) when what was written, and what was done, could only alarm our Fears and warn us of our Danger ; yet numberless Books were published to explain its Importance ; numberless Plans were formed,

ed, and numberless Attempts made, to carry those Speculations into Realities. How far they at one Time succeeded; how near they were to succeeding still further; with how much Expence of Blood and Treasure, assisted in some Instances by signal Interventions of Providence, we prevented a temporary Loss, if not a total and irretrievable Ruin; must be fresh in every Body's Memory, who goes no farther back than the History of the present War: and who has not already forgotten *Braddock's* Overthrow, *Murray's* Defeat, *Johnson's* Deliverance, and *Wolfe's* glorious Death and Victory. Such were the Perils to which we have been exposed from *Canada*; and such hath been the Strength derived from its Possession for a Century past to a small Number of *French* invading, terrifying, and endangering a Nation of *Britons*.

It is as idle to deny these Facts, and to assert, with this Author, that our Colonies were exposed to slight Depredations and little Danger, (from P. 73 to 86.) as it is trifling and unfair to distinguish away *Canada* in its Effects, because it is distinguished in Name, from other Possessions which the *French* claimed on the same Continent. (P. 62. 63. 67. 71.) Had *France* any considerable

considerable Strength in any other Part? Did not all her other Establishments draw their Existence, their Supplies, and their Support from thence? Did not the *French* who led the Savages to *Braddock's* Overthrow, come from *Canada*? Did not *Murray* and *Wolfe* fight in *Canada*? Was not *Johnson* attacked, and *New York* menaced from thence? If the *French* had then succeeded, was not their Passage open, easy and short, to a secure Port on the *Atlantic Ocean*? An Object often before attempted, never lost Sight of, and without the Attainment of which, a Nation planted in *Canada*, equal to old *France*, would be of little avail to her. The Advantages obtained by *France* where ever they appeared, and the Dangers to us where ever they threatened, all had their Source in *Canada*. And as they could only arise from thence, the Possession of *Canada* can alone secure us from them.

But this Distinction becomes the less necessary, and sinks into a mere Dispute about Words, while he, whose Opinions this Author combats, means with him, at least the intire Possession of that immense Tract of Territory, which extends from *Canada* to the Banks of the *Mississippi*. If more cannot be obtained, if *France* refuses to yield to us
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what we have not conquered of *North America*; this Refusal furnishes still a stronger Proof of the Importance of what we have already acquired, by our Enemy's Attachment to a Territory yielding fewer Advantages. Fertile as *Louisiana* may be, much of what is comprehended within the Limits here described is as fertile, while the greater Difficulties of an Intercourse between that Settlement and *Europe*, by a more intricate, hazardous, and tedious Navigation, must proportionably reduce its Value to *France*.

The Author urges many Reasons, which, altho' insufficient to prove our Security, on a Supposition that *France* were permitted to repossess *Canada*, (P. 35.) are irrefragable against any Dangers to be apprehended from *Louisiana* bounded by the *Mississippi*. And there are Circumstances peculiar to this Settlement, which render those Arguments thus applied still stronger. A Colony long neglected, thin in People, and destitute of other internal Defence, is ill fitted for offensive Purposes. That immense River which separates it from us, receives many other smaller Rivers from our Territory. The Current of them all in our Favour; and the Advantages which *Louisiana* may derive from an *Indian Trade* through this Circumstance,

stance, are sufficiently lowered by the Author not to need any further Diminution. (P. 49.) Yet the Stream which brings the Savage with his Furs and Skins to the *French* Market, impedes his Return with Commodities more difficult to carry. And were the Value and Conveniences of that Trade much greater to *France*, yet the Security we should obtain from the Course of the Rivers, would be an abundant Compensation for them. Security of our old Possessions and our old Rights is the Object of greatest Importance to us : The Invasion of these, and the Defence of them, caused the many bloody Contests, in which we and *France* have been engaged upon the *American* Continent with various Success. In this View (and in this only) hath *Canada* been important to *France* ; and in this View, altho' it should yield no more than the pitiful Import which the Author brings to its Account, (P. 49.) (in which by the Bye he omits a most material and valuable Article of Fishery) yet the Purchase was well made, at the Expence of much Blood and immense Treasure. Great as the Examiners Authority may be, and ingenious and artful as his Arguments certainly are, to prove that our Colonies neither incurred Danger, nor can receive Defence from *Canada* ; he hath

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the Opinion of two great Nations to contend with, *that Canada is virtually the British Empire in North America.*

But, it seems, this boasted Empire is no more than a secondary Object; yielding so far in Importance to our Sugar Islands, that "one White Man in the *West Indies* is worth, to the Trade of his Mother Country, about Eight in *North America*," (P. 30.) And, in this Proportion, Ninety thousand Whites, the computed Number in all our Islands, enervated, sickly, and short-lived, stand in Value to 1,500,000 (*ibid.*) Inhabitants of a more healthy Soil, constantly doubling, by natural Increase, in less than Twenty-five Years, and recruited every Year; in Time of Peace, by about Twelve thousand Foreigners. "For if a Million and a Half of Inhabitants in *North America* (to say nothing of the Troops) took off, in the Year 1758, but 1,832,948 *l.* 13 *s.* 10 *d.* and Ninety thousand Inhabitants in the *West Indies* 877,571 *l.* 19 *s.* 11 *d.* it appears, at a Glance, how much more valuable the Trade of the *West Indies* is than the Trade of *North America*, in Proportion to the Number of Inhabitants," (P. 30, 31.) But does it appear, at a Glance, that the

the Whole of our Exports to the *West Indies* is consumed there? or consumed by the Whites only? And is not a Part employed in Trade with the *Spanish Main*? Or, to allow the Author's Argument the full Scope of his Assertion, does it necessarily follow, from a greater proportional Consumption of our Commodities in the *West Indies*, that their Trade, under all the Circumstances attending them, is, in like Proportion, more valuable to us? and that a White with them is worth Eight in *North America*, because his Share of that Consumption stands in this Proportion? These Points shall be now examined: Nor shall the Inference, P. 31, "That we should make the Increase of our Possessions between the Tropicks the primary and leading Object of our Policy," go without Observation in its due Place.

As to the first Point; our Author is too well instructed in the Matter, upon which he treats, not to admit, that an increasing Trade is, in this Respect, superior to another near at a Stand, and which, in his Opinion, is not susceptible of any great Improvement. (P. 29.) But if this Circumstance can create a Preference in any Instance, how superlatively must it operate in favour of *North*

America, compared with our *West Indies*? Our Exports to the last hardly at all increase: The Author admits the Fact, and builds upon it, (his Inference shall hereafter be considered) (P. 29.) Nor does he controvert the Authenticity of an Account given by the *Considerer*, (P. 57) in which it appears, that the Exports to *North America* have gone on increasing from 640,114*l.* 12*s.* 4*d.* in 1744, to 1,832,948*l.* 13*s.* 10*d.* in 1758; while the Supply to our *West Indian* Islands, which, in the first of these Years, amounted to 796,112*l.* 17*s.* 3*d.* rose in the last only to 877,571*l.* 19*s.* 11*d.* And as, in the above astonishing Increase, the Quantity of Exports to *North America* appears to have near doubled its Value in Ten Years, and in 1758 was more than double the Demand from the *West Indies*; there is no Reason to suppose, that the same immense Disproportion will not proceed in a progressive Increase; and that, in the Year 1768, the Exports to *North America* will not stand to the other as One is to Four.

Let the Author now answer: Is it so very clear, that we should make the Increase of a Trade, thus circumstanced, the primary and leading Object of our Policy, by an Addition of more Possessions between the Tropicks; which, if freed from other Ob-

Objections, that shall hereafter be explained, must ever remain subject to one, the most capital and important, in common with those Islands which we have long possessed, without any Increase of White Inhabitants, and where the lamentable Waste of Disease and Death can alone be supplied from *Great Britain*? But, in the Author's Calculation of the Value of Man, Health, Strength, and long Life, are unimportant Circumstances; and a White, who lives not half his Days, and those consumed in Luxury and Idleness, who leaves behind him, if any, a scanty Progeny, inheriting the Diseases, Weakness, and Indolence of their Parent, would, in the *West Indies*, be worth Eight Antediluvians in *North America*, cultivating a Country with their Hands, and peopling it with their Issue; yet to Men resembling these nearer than the present Race of Mortals does in any other Part of the known World, (P. 75) are we indebted for an Increase of Wealth, more than doubling with the stupendous Increase of their Numbers.

If it be granted, that (P. 24) the *West Indies* might be supplied directly from *England* with Articles which come from our Northern Plantations, “ it is admitted, not
“ quite

“ quite so cheap, nor with so much Convenience,” with Plank, Lumber, and Staves, of which we do not produce, in any degree, sufficient for our own Use; yet if the Importance of these Supplies, and the Loss and Expence of having them from *Great Britain*, could be accurately calculated, it would be found, that, if *North America* withheld her Produce, it would be attended with still more fatal Consequences to her Neighbours than to her, with a Loss of still more than Three Fourths of their whole Trade, (P. 25.) And what is said in P. 20, of their Trade with us, is as truly applicable to that which they carry on with *North America*, “ necessary to them as their Existence.” From hence it follows, that whatever the Value of a White Man may be in the *West Indies* to the Mother Country, (even if rated at 23 *l.* Sterling) (P. 99), the *North American* justly claims a large Proportion of it; which, if fairly deducted from one and added to the other, will immensely raise the Figure of the injured *Pennsylvanian*, debased by this Author, even so low as 20 *s.* in Value, P. 99. What the *North Americans* lose in Importance at home, should be allowed them abroad; where their Industry is more useful to the few helpless Planters of Sugar and Indigo than to their
own

own numerous Neighbourhood, equally possessed of Superfluities, the Fruits of their own Industry.

The Trade for salted Beef from *Ireland* (P. 21) will still remain unrivalled and unlesened by any Part of *North America*; while *Newfoundland* contributes largely, by its Consumption of that and other Articles of Provision, to the Advantages derived from the *Irish* Trade: And whatever the Consumption of *British* Merchandize, by Individuals, may be in different Places, we have already observed the superior Increase of the Quantities called for by the whole Aggregate of our Northern Colonies.

The Author confesses, in P. 24. " That " the insular and continental Colonies of " *America*, are reciprocally beneficial to " each other": but he adds, that " the Benefit, tho' reciprocal, is not equal." Neither indeed is it, but in a Sense very different from his. In the great Articles of Defence and Navigation, the Superiority is wholly on the Side of the latter; who in the Day of Danger have importantly co-operated with us in our Fleets and Armies, for the Protection of defenceless Islands. In War and in Peace, their Seamen and their Ships are employed

ployed with ours, to and from those Ports; which never fitted out a Vessel or bred from among the Natives a single Mariner. By what Superiority in other Articles are these balanced? If the *West Indies* supply *North America* with Produce and Manufacture peculiar to them, *North America* hath also her Productions, as exclusively hers; and Rice and dried Fish are at least as much Necessaries of Life in the one, as Spirits and Melasses in the other. Corn, Flour and Bread produced in *Europe*, are to the *West Indies*, by reason of its Distance, almost as if they did not exist there. And that the Balance of Trade between the *West Indies* and *North America* (P. 23.) is always considerably in favour of the latter, is as certain, as that this Fact demonstrably proves the greater Dependence of the Islands upon the Continent: or, in other Words, that they want most of what is produced by the other. Yet the Inference drawn by the Author is the reverse; and he extends it to *Africa*, as well as to our Northern Colonies; which he affects to rank in the same Order, with a View to lessen the Importance of the last. But immensely more considerable as the *West Indian* Trade is, abstractedly considered, than the *African*, yet this is certainly not a dependent Member upon the other.

(P. 24.)

(P. 24.) *Africa* might sell her Slaves to other Nations, and other of our Colonies. She actually does ; but the *West Indies* cannot produce a single Sugar Cane without her Assistance. If this does not create a Dependence, I know nothing that can ; and were we thus circumstanced with regard to *Sweden*, *Denmark* and *Russia*, for our naval Stores ; could *North America* not afford a Supply ; we should certainly be, with all our Trade and all our Wealth, in a total Dependence for both upon Countries much less considerable than ours. The Author, before he infers a Dependence of our *North American* and *African* Trade upon our *West Indian*, from “ the Rise or Fall of those, as the latter flourishes or decays ;” P. 24. should be better prepared to prove than he seems to be, that the same Consequences would not respectively follow, in still greater Degree, were the Supposition inverted. That this Effect would not attend in *North America* a Rise or Decline in the *West Indies*, is sufficiently apparent from the amazing Increase of its Trade, while that of the other hath been near at a stand. But he who would give up *Senegal* and *Goree* for the *French* Conquests in *Germany*, (P. 91.) and who is of Opinion that *Canada* might be restored without Loss or Danger, (P. 85.)

acts consistently in representing *Africa* and *North America* not only in a secondary Light, (P. 25.) but as dependent Members. P. 24.

The Examiner complains, P. 27. that in *The Interest of Great Britain considered*, instead of a complete Account of our Exports to, and Imports from, *North America* and the *West Indies* respectively, the first Part is only given, and to supply this Defect he gives the whole, but for one Year only. Had he transcribed the last half Sheet of the Pamphlet he answers, it would have appeared, that the Exports to *North America*, which from 1744 to 1748 inclusive, exceeded those to the *West Indies* only in the Sum of 122,936*l.* 10*s.* 4*d.* went on increasing in so much a larger Proportion, as to create an additional Difference from 1754 to 1758, also inclusive, of 3,646,215*l.* 11*s.* 4*d.* In each of the three last Years of this Period, the Exports to *North America* are more than double, and in the two first nearly double of what he states the whole *North American* annual Produce. P. 100. He could not resist the Temptation, under a fallacious and ambiguous Expression, to cast a Balance so favourable to *Guadaloupe*, as to leave a Difference of only 18,413*l.* 11*s.* 4*d.* between

tween her Returns and the Produce of all the *North American* Colonies put together : and therefore he measures the whole Quantity of that Produce by their Exports hither, as stated in P. 27. This Attempt explains his Fondness for contrasting the Imports from *North America*, with those from the *West Indies*, and accounts for the *Considerer's* giving the Exports from hence only, and not misleading his Reader by an inconclusive Comparison. For the Advantages of Trade with any Country, can only be determined by the Exports of our own consequential upon it. The Product of our *West Indies* was all consumed here, because the whole did not exceed the Home Demand ; and it bore a higher Price here than it would in any other Market to which it could be conveyed. In 1758, it amounted to 1,834,036*l.* 2*s.* 2*d.* for which Returns were made from hence to the Value of 877,571*l.* 19*s.* 11*d.* P. 27. The Produce of *North America* imported here in the same Year, was not one Third of its whole Export, because it produced more than we demanded ; and the Value of that Surplus was by Consequence more at other Markets, than it would have been at ours. But altho' the Imports from thence did not rise higher than 648,683*l.* 0*s.* 4*d.* yet our Ex-

ports thither being 1,832,948 *l.* 13 *s.* 10 *d.* it would be absurd to take the Measure of national Gain from the first, and not the last of these Sums. Yet to the *North American* Account must be added, the Profits upon Re-exportation, which in Furs, Rice, and Tobacco, brings us more from Foreigners than the Value of the whole Import from *North America* above stated. Thus, beside a Supply for our own Wants, *North America's* Exports create a Balance in our Favour with other Countries to which she and we trade; and if we consider the Nature of those Wants which she supplies, few of them will appear the Cravings of Luxury, while we stand indebted for many Materials of Manufacture, and for many naval Stores, to that inexhaustible Possession. Whether the Returns in *British* Manufactures be paid for in Tobacco from *Virginia*, or in *Jamaica* Sugars purchased by *New England*, in a Balance of Trade it matters little. The only Question of Importance is, which of the Colonies, our *West Indian* or *North American*, contribute most, whether mediately or immediately, to the Value of our Lands, and to the Labour and Employment of our People? A Question which it is impossible not to decide greatly in Favour of *North America*.

The

The Author further observes, (P. 25.)
 “ On the relative Value to *Great Britain* of
 “ our *West Indian* and Northern Colonies,
 “ that the Duties imposed upon Sugar form
 “ no contemptible Object in our Revenue;
 “ while no one Commodity of *North Ame-*
 “ *rica*, except Tobacco, (he might also
 “ have excepted Rice, Furs, and Skins) is
 “ in the least subservient either there or
 “ here to our Expences, and to the Sup-
 “ port of the general Interest.” But they
 are subservient to that Interest in its best
 understood and most important Sense: They
 serve Navigation and Manufacture; and
 from their universal Use, claim and have
 obtained an Exemption from Burthens justly
 imposed upon barren Luxury. This Cir-
 cumstance urged by the Author as favour-
 able to his Cause, turns directly against him.
 When, in P. 37. he magnifies the Impor-
 tance of *Guadaloupe*, by the Benefits arising
 from the Cotton it produces, he doth not
 propose to increase those Advantages by im-
 posing a Duty upon it; for he well knows
 it is much more valuable to the Public, by
 being freed from such a Burthen.

“ In *Guadaloupe* a Material of Manufac-
 “ ture may (in his Estimation) be of greater
 “ commercial Consequence than Sugars.”
 Why

Why then (in P. 27.) hath he omitted "to direct the Reader's Attention" to this Consequence, in Favour of *North America*? He might have bestowed a few Lines upon Oil, Iron, Staves, Furs, Flax-seed, Indigo, and Skins; to which he might have added, though not all in the same Predicament, Turpentine, Pitch, Tar, and Masts. He might have shewn, that with such Imports, Wealth flows in upon us; that the Expences of Government can be supplied from no other Stock; and that the enormous Debt contracted during this War cannot be cleared, or even lessened, by any other Means than those, which, furnishing Industry with Materials for Employment, and Art for Improvement, enable all Ranks of People to consume even taxed Luxuries, among which Sugar indeed "forms no contemptible Object." (P. 25.) He might have inferred, or his Readers would have spared him the Trouble, that while the *West Indies* are indebted for their Produce to the Supplies they receive from *North America*; they are further indebted to her for a Part of the Consumption of that Produce here, upon which he makes their Existence depend. (P. 20.) But this Inference would draw her from that "secondary Light" in which she had been before placed, and exalt her
 " from

“ from a dependent Member,” to be “ the
 “ primary Object in the System of our Co-
 “ lonies.” (P. 25.) Such *North America*
 really is. Rich in the Produce of every
 Climate, and every Soil; already greatly,
 though unequally, inhabited; grown in Po-
 pulation (with a Certainty of infinitely a
 greater Growth) beyond Example, and al-
 most beyond Belief; yet less wonderful in
 her Numbers, than in the Increase of those
 Advantages we derive from them; for
 these double, as hath been already observed,
 in half that Time, which only doubles the
 Race that produces them. Here indeed
 Humanity cannot refrain from lamenting,
 that some, although by much the smallest,
 Part of those Advantages can only be ob-
 tained from *North America*, by Means,
 which, while they enrich the Planter, dis-
 grace the human Species; and that our
 Southern Provinces upon the Continent, as
 far as they partake of the Nature of our
 Islands, share, although in much a smaller
 Degree, the Opprobrium justly thrown
 upon them. (P. 67.)

But our Author tells us, (P. 23.) “ It is
 “ by Means of the *West Indian* Trade that
 “ a great Part of *North America* is at all
 “ enabled to trade with us; and that we
 “ should

“ should well consider before we give up,
 “ *Guadaloupe*, an Island worth to us 600,000*l.*
 “ a Year.” P. 94. We shall soon see, even
 from his own State of the Imports from,
 and Exports to, that Island, that not above
 Two-fifths of this Sum remain with us;
 and that much the greatest Proportion of
 the Surplus, if not all, must center in *France*.
 But how doth he prove his first Proposi-
 tion? As I have already remarked, he ad-
 mits, with the Author of *The Interest of*
Great Britain considered, that our *West In-*
dian Trade is near at a Stand; and he doth
 not controvert the Account, by which it ap-
 pears, that our Exports to *North America*
 have doubled in ten Years. How then can
 this surprising Increase be paid for by the
West Indies, “ either in Cash, or in Bills
 “ drawn by the *West Indian* Merchant, on
 “ *London*, or in the Return of *West Indian*
 “ Produce on *North American* Account?”
 (P. 23.) He doth not say, that the Balance
 to the *West Indies* is increased: That Trade
 he tells us is at a Stand. The *African* de-
 mand is still supplied out of it, and the Ex-
 pences of *West Indian* Planters, resident in
England, are not lessened (P. 28): An Ad-
 vantage to us, such as it is, which no
 Friend to the *West Indies*, except our Au-
 thor, wishes to be increased, or even conti-
 nued

nued from thence; and which no one but an Enemy to our Northern Colonies, except himself, wishes to be supplied by them. Will the Author venture to solve this Paradox, by asserting that the *West Indian* Planters, however extravagant here, are become so much more prudent at home, as to afford from their Parsimony a Sufficiency to answer an immensely increasing Demand of *North American* Supplies? Doth that Increase actually exist in such Proportion? If it doth, why are not its beneficial Effects felt in the *West Indian* Trade? And why should that be at a Stand? If our Balance from the North could be discharged by no other Means, the hospitable and luxurious *West Indian* Planter would, in Time, be reduced to feed upon no better Fare, than he allows to the Man-beast, who is now goaded by his inhuman Driver. But while the Imports here remain unaugmented, and the Draughts upon them for *British* Goods for the *African* Trade, and for the Expences of *West Indians* dwelling here remain the same, how is the Fund to arise in *West Indian* unincreasing Imports, to answer the immense Increase of Exports to *North America*? Until some better Solution can be found for this Problem, we must be contented with one plain and obvious. The

G

Trade

Trade of our *North American* Colonies goes on augmenting to our own and other Countries, yielding us many of those useful Articles in Manufacture and Navigation, upon which all our Trade depends, which were purchased by us before, and are still in too great a Degree brought to us, from the Northern Nations of *Europe*, who take little from us in return except our Money. The *North American* Trade, with other Countries of *Europe*, is increased by an annual Influx of Money from *Mexico* and *South America* into those Countries, and is in Things, most of which we cannot furnish: In others produced in common with us, which are either wanted at home, or lie more convenient to other Markets. Or if we meet with a *North American* there, we find a Fellow Subject instead of a foreign Rival; while in return for any small Disadvantage felt in the Sale of our Produce, we receive an ample Recompence from them in a vent of Manufactures, worth four times the Price of their Materials. (P. 65.) Such are the Advantages, and such are the Causes, of this immense Increase of a growing Empire, which already raises us to a Level with the most Mighty in *Europe*; and beside increasing our Commerce, supplies, by an incredible Increase of People, that only Defect, which

which confined us, as a State, to the third or fourth Place in the Scale of *European* Powers.

If, as I flatter myself it now appears, our *North American* Colonies are of an Importance greatly superior to our *West Indies*; let us examine how far, in the Author's Argument, these may be rendered more considerable to us, and the general Interest of the Nation be improved by retaining *Guadaloupe*.

The Number of Whites in *Guadaloupe* are computed by the Author (P. 99) at Ten thousand; and the Owners of Lands there, whether resident or not resident in *Old France*, have their Property secured to them by Capitulation. While therefore our Faith is preserved, they cannot be restrained from enriching their Mother Country with the Expenditure or Superfluity of their Income. What the Amount of this may be to *Old France*, may be nearly collected from an Account of the Imports in 1761, and the Exports in 1760, to and from *Guadaloupe*, as given us by this Author, with a View to magnify the Value of that Island to *Great Britain*; and it stands in P. 43 and 44 thus,

Imports from	—	£ 603,269 3 9
Exports to	—	118,569 5 10
For 4000 Negro Slaves purchased there this Year,	}	120,000 0 0
		<hr/> 238,569 5 10 <hr/>

Here it must be remarked, that the Whole of this last Article cannot be fairly brought to our Account of Gain from *Guadaloupe*, as such an extraordinary Supply to that Island hath been proportionably detrimental to our other Colonies; whose Demands for that Article never have been, and never can be, exceeded by the Number of Slaves brought to them from the *African* Coast. Nor will this be only a temporary Disadvantage to them, who have the comfortable Prospect opened, in P. 42, of its future Continuance; and the Author's Assurance, that *Guadaloupe* will "be the very " best Market for Slaves."

Thus it appears, in a fair Inference from the Facts produced by this Author, that a very considerable and disproportionate Share of the clear Balance of Import and Export, to and from this new Acquisition, remains the Property of *France*; increasing with the Improve-

Improvements of that Island; earned with a grievous and justly complained of Loss to our old Settlements; (not only in our Sugar Islands, but also in our Southern Continent of *America*) who already feel, in the high Price and Scarcity of Slaves, the Mischief of having those annual Supplies intercepted from them; the Fruits of whose Labour would all ultimately center in *Great Britain*.

The superior Importance of our old Possessions, beyond this new one, cannot be better demonstrated than by one Part of an Account brought by the Author, in P. 27, to serve another Purpose. And, as I mean to answer him by his own Facts, I take the Years and Valuations as he states them.

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
Imports from our <i>West Indies</i> in 1759, ————	1,834,036	2	2
Exports to the <i>West Indies</i> in 1758, ————	877,571	19	11
To which should be added, <i>British Merchandize</i> sent from hence for the Purchase of Slaves in 1761, ————	254,381	11	5
<i>East India Goods</i> ————	78,576	18	6
	1,210,530	9	10
	These		

These two last Articles are as properly introduced here, as the whole Value of the Slaves, intercepted by *Guadaloupe* from our other Colonies, was unfairly admitted, to swell the Sum of our Exports thither, and the Advantages derived to us from thence. But, even thus exaggerated, how disproportionably small does it appear, in that most essential and evident Article of national Gain; a Vent of the Product of our Soil, Industry, and Commerce. The Exports to our own *West Indies*, as above stated, are as Two to Three; while those to *Guadaloupe* do not exceed Two to Five: How much of the remaining Three Fifths is sent to *France* cannot, with Precision, be said. That very little of it is spent by *Guadaloupians* here is certain; and it is equally certain, that, as no Money is ever remitted from hence to the *West Indies*, (P. 28) the whole remaining Third of the Balance due from us to our old Possessions is cleared, in one Shape or another, by *British* Commodities. In P. 17 the Author asserts, that “ the (*French*) “ *West Indies* furnished (*France*) with an “ exported Produce worth 2,070,471 *l.* a “ Year, all which was purchased by her “ Manufactures.” Now, if this be true, it is a further Proof of the much greater Importance of Possessions to the Mother Country,

try, which are peopled from thence, than of others, where (altho' the Dominion be acquired to the Crown) a large Share of the Property must still remain with the old Inhabitants. And blameable would that Policy be, which would retain these at the Expence of the former. These Circumstances, upon every Principle of equitable Accommodation, point out *Martinico* and *Guadaloupe* as a proper Exchange for all that *France* possessed and claimed in *North America*, as far as the *Mississipi* runs; the last being most important to us, as the first is to her. By such Adjustments alone can a speedy Peace be obtained, and upon such Principles alone can a permanent Peace be established, while that which is yielded with least Difficulty, will be retained with least Hazard and Expence.

But our Author tells us, "*Guadaloupe*, in " the natural Course of Things, must, in a " few Years, be almost wholly *English*," (P. 46.) Is this Prediction justified by Experience in other Acquisitions, ceded to us by former Treaties, in *Europe* and *America*? Did the *Minorquines* become more *Englishmen* by being upwards of Forty Years subject to the Crown of *Great Britain*? Did not the *Acadians* still remain *French* during the

the same Period? while a pretended Neutrality disguised a secret Enemy. Would the *Spaniards* remain in *Jamaica* after it became *English*? or the *French* in that Part of *St. Christopher's* which was yielded to us? Those of *Guadaloupe*, indeed, would certainly not follow the Example of these latter, and quit the Island; but retaining the same Attachments there, would render more real Service to *France*, than they could by a Migration into any other of her Possessions. And satisfied as some *Guadaloupians* may be under our Dominion, and impossible as it is now for the Dissatisfied to free themselves from it, will not the Multitude of Proprietors in that Island, who now shew which Country they esteem their Home, by making it the Repository of their Wealth, avail themselves of the Security of Peace to assist that Country in any Attempt of regaining the Whole of what it hath lost? Confident I am, that the Author's Allowance of one Regiment would not be thought a sufficient Security against such an Event, (P. 52); and that the Attachment of *Frenchmen* to their Mother Country, and the Maxims of *France* with regard to the Obligations of Treaties, will require a far larger and more expensive military Establishment to protect *Guadaloupe* from their Effects.

Inde-

Indefinite as the growing Demand of Sugars may be, (and it increases no where so much as in our own Market, for an every Day increasing Consumption) yet the Means by which that Produce is raised are limited; and the Number of Slaves furnished by *Africa* rather diminishes than increases. This Circumstance must set Bounds to the Production of Sugars, altho' there should be none to the Demand. And the Consequence must necessarily be, what it apparently is, an Increase of Price: While those Islands, which have natural Advantages over ours (as *Martinico* and *Guadaloupe* are represented by the Advocates for their Importance) will be better able to pay higher Prices for Slaves, and will be the first supplied, (P. 42.) when our Slave Markets shall be thrown open to them, equally with our old Possessions, which must then be contented, as the *French* formerly were, with a neglected Refuse.

Were the Sugars of the World to be imported here, such an Abundance would naturally add, in the first Place, to the amazing Increase of its Consumption at home, attended by another, which in the general Use of Tea is already pernicious to at least the lower Ranks of our People.

H

Cer-

Certain it is, and the Author confesses the Fact (P. 16.) that before the War, the Production of our Colonies did not furnish enough for our increasing Use : And if after devouring our own, the Deficiency was supplied from *France*, under all the Hazards and Difficulties of a contraband Trade ; our insatiable Appetite, increasing as it is fed, may justify the Apprehensions of the *Considerer*, (P. 46.) “ that most of what can be imported from any additional Acquisitions “ would also stop here.” To which he might have added, as I have above observed, the Growth of another Evil, inseparable from this ; the increasing Consumption of a hurtful foreign Luxury, and the Decrease of a valuable Export.

Great as the natural Advantages of the *French* Sugar Islands are represented, we have certainly been long in Possession of one Advantage, extremely important to ours : We have possessed, in a superior Degree, the *African* Market ; while their Supplies were only the Gleanings of ours, and being in a great Proportion, in Despite of severe Penalties, supplied by us, they purchased at a higher Price an inferior Merchandize. While our Navigation in the *African* Seas, and our Settlements upon the Coasts, to which this
War

War hath added, remain superior to theirs, that Market must be ours still, in a greater Extent than it ever yet hath been : And less important will a Restitution of their Islands be to them, if we retain a greater Share, than we had before, of the only Means by which their Importance can be maintained. I repeat it again, the Slave-Trade is limited and declining ; it is essential to every *West Indian* Production ; and every Slave intercepted by *Martinico* and *Guadaloupe* from *Jamaica*, *Barbadoes*, the *Leeward Islands*, and our Southern Continent, is so much taken from them, who would finally return the Whole of its Value to us, in order to bestow it where not above Two Fifths become ours.

I shall not pretend to say, how far *Jamaica* may be improved, nor join with those who assert, that Two-parts in Three of that Island, fit for the Production of Sugars, lye uncultivated ; which with the other Third might be rendered sufficient to serve all *Europe*. I believe this Account exaggerated : But enough of it remains incontestably true, to render it disputable, whether the insatiable Avarice of Monopolists there, or the supine Neglect here, in those whose Interest directs them, and whose Power enables

them to controul the most lawless Abuse of legal Grants, be most shamefully blameable. But a Neglect of what is our own, hath long been the Disgrace of this Country, in Islands much nearer our Observation than *Jamaica*. The Extravagance of straining at more, while this Neglect continues, hath however not been the Sin of former Times. This seems reserved for those who would now have this Nation imitate the Example of lesser Monopolists, and be to other Countries, what the *Jamaica*-Planter is to his own. It is certain, that *Jamaica* hath increased its Produce : it is as certain, that this Increase may be carried still farther, without expensive Roads, blowing up Rocks and erecting Bridges, every two or three hundred Yards : (Int. of Col. P. 46.) and it is equally certain, that this Effect may be produced by other Causes, than an advanced Price of Sugars, beyond their present immoderate Rate : (*Ibid.*) and that a lowering of their Price, would be the necessary and immediate Consequence of Improvements, which at the same Time would preserve the Health, and save the Lives of Thousands. But if to the Advantages of Soil in the *French* Sugar Islands, and to some Qualities in their People, spending little and saving much from small Profits, we add cheap and plentiful

plentiful Supplies of the best Slaves from the Coast of *Africa*, and of Lumber and other Necessaries from our *North America*, purchased with Credit at low Interest; then indeed the Exertion of better Policy would come too late for the Relief of *Jamaica*; she and our other Islands, the Plants of *British* Soil, must wither under the Shade of their spreading Neighbours.

Thus far I have followed the *Examiner*, and I shall follow him but a little further; merely as far as the Title prefixed to his Pamphlet leads me, and his professed Design (P. 1.) of enabling us to determine, how far it will be consistent with our Interest, on a similar Occasion, to adopt or reject that System of Pacification, which appears in the Negotiation of 1761. Whether our Ministers did or did not depart from “the fundamental Principle of the Treaty, laid down by *France* herself.” P. 90. is not the Question now, whatever it might then have been. That Treaty hath been long at an End: And if they relaxed in the Course of it, the Presumption is strong, that they could not prevail in a more rigid Interpretation of Terms not so clear, but that they required a further Explanation; which when given by *France*, fell very
 2 short

short of the Extent, in which they were understood by some of our Cabinet. I have therefore left, and shall still leave the *Examiner* in full Enjoyment of his Triumph over the late Administration, upon the Inferiority of those *Possessions*, which *France* was to yield, in Compensation for those to be ceded to us ; restraining as he does the Word *Possessions*, to the respective Conquests made by both Parties. (P. 90.) If a reciprocal Equivalent, was to be the Condition of every Cession, made by either Party, the Restitution of *Belleisle*, *Senegal*, or *Goree*, would no doubt be an Equivalent for all that *France* had then conquered. But such a Peace would be somewhat “ inconsistent with the loftiest Dignity on her Side, or the most diffident Humility on ours.” (P. 90. and 91.)

In P. 90. the Author asks, “ if *France* had been in Possession of all *Canada*, and we Masters only of the Fisheries of *Newfoundland* and *St. Lawrence* ; if in this Situation, we had admitted her to a Participation of these Fisheries, in Exchange for *Canada*, whether any fair Arbitrator would not have considered it as a Bargain, extremely advantageous to *France* ?” I agree with the Author, he certainly would ; and the Bargain is still more advantageous, as we are
“ indis-

“ indisputably Masters both of one and the
 “ other.” (P. 90.) *Canada* produces little
 to *France* ; and the Fishery is of infinite Ad-
 vantage to her, without which she must re-
 main deprived of an Article greatly neces-
 sary to her Subsistence, and to that of her
 Sugar Islands : Nor could she, without it,
 have the Means of becoming a Maritime
 Power. But for these very Reasons, *France*
 never will submit to an Exclusion, which
 would make a total and perpetual Disabi-
 lity the Purchase of a present precarious
 Peace ; and under the Pretence of retain-
 ing one Part of what we have acquired,
 would render what we yielded of little Va-
 lue ; leaving the miserable Remains abso-
 lutely subject to our Power. Perpetual
 War must be the Result of such extravagant
 Projects : And how little we are prepared
 for such an unchristian Measure, needs no
 farther Explanation. The *Examiner* seems
 aware of these Consequences : He doth not
 even hint at our possessing an exclusive Fi-
 shery, and only contrasts it with *Canada*, to
 expose the little Value of that Acquisition
 compared with a considerable Object. But
 there are many who widely differ in Opi-
 nion from him ; enough from their Weight
 and Number to claim the Attention of
 those, who examine the commercial Prin-
 ciples

ciples upon which a Peace ought to be concluded. The Author should, therefore, after establishing the Importance of *Guadeloupe*, give some Reasons for not insisting upon an Exclusion of *France* from the Banks of *Newfoundland*, and the Gulph of *St. Lawrence* : And if he really means that some Sacrifices “ should be made to the “ Peace of *Europe* ;” (P. 92.) after securing “ the fairest and fattest of our Flock,” (P. 93.) from the Knife of the Sacrificer, he should mark out, in his turn, some Victims, less costly, but sufficient to save the Lives of Thousands of the human Species, now devoted to the infernal Furies of War.

But if the comparative Value to *France* of her Sugar-Islands and Fisheries were to be adjusted by her, I am not clear, whether in *French* Estimation the last would not preponderate, even as much as the *West Indies* do, in our Author’s Balance, against *North America*. But it hath been shewn, that comparative Benefits arising to *France*, are an unsure Scale of the Interests of *Great Britain* : Things of less Value to her may be of an Importance to us, infinitely greater than others which she holds at much a higher Price. Such is the Territory we have acquired

quired in *North America*, with respect to her Islands, and such it may be with respect to an exclusive Fishery. One Thing is certain: The Loss to her would be more than any positive Gain to us, in the last as well as the first Instance; and *France* and her Islands would be exposed to all the Extremities of Want, rather than open their Markets to *British* Fishermen bringing a *British* Manufacture. Nor is this true of *France* only; *Spain* hath, since her Declaration of War, prohibited the Importation of Fish from *Newfoundland*; and the Pope hath freed her Subjects, by Indulgences, from those Fasts which rendered it indispensably necessary. How far the same ecclesiastical Policy may prevail in other Popish Countries (and those of that Religion are our only Customers for Fish in *Europe*) cannot be foretold. But should an Enmity to Heretic *England* prevail with the See of *Rome*, to dispense with her own Injunctions; and a Jealousy of all-grasping *England* incline other Popish States to avail themselves of such Dispensations; instead of acquiring more by an Attempt to possess all, we may lose a Share, if not the whole, of what we before enjoyed.

The Mud-Fishery, a considerable Branch, hath no vent but in *France*, and hath never been carried on by any but *Frenchmen* in any degree worth Notice. This never can be ours; and those who compute our additional Gains, and the increasing Number of Fishermen in an exclusive Fishery, by adding to our own Stock all that *France* had, must deduct from their sanguine Calculations this very important Item. We may, no doubt, refuse to *France* what was granted to her by the Treaty of *Utrecht*, a Place to dry her Fish on: We may prosecute the War until she acquiesces in a Refusal, which would deprive her Islands in *America*, and her Southern Provinces in *Europe*, of a material Article of Sustenance; and we see what may be the Consequence of such Policy—a perpetual War, and the Hazard of losing all. We may go yet farther in our Demands; we may arrogate an exclusive Empire over the *Atlantic* Ocean, and forbid a *Frenchman* (although concealed in perpetual Fogs) to carry a Hook, or cast a Line in any Part of it; we may stipulate what all the Navies of the World cannot enforce: But before we proceed thus far, we must, by a previous Article in the same Treaty, restrain the *French* from fishing close to our Coasts in the *British* Channel.

What

What Effect this might have on the *Dutch*, and how far it might alarm them for their Herring-Fishery, is a small Consideration with those, who would have *Great Britain* assume the Port and Character of an uncontrouled Arbiter over all the Maritime Powers of *Europe*. But our Author justly and finely observes, (P. 5.) “ It is only in
 “ Time of great Prosperity, that States are
 “ entirely Masters of their own Conduct,
 “ and in a Capacity of executing new
 “ Schemes of Policy: An Error in those
 “ Schemes becomes at that Time highly
 “ dangerous, because they have then Ability
 “ to push their Error as far as it will go;
 “ and the Mischief they bring upon themselves, is proportionable to the Strength
 “ which they abuse. An erroneous Policy
 “ always precedes a declining Power.” This Passage was well worth transcribing. But whether an Abuse of Strength in Prosperity be not more likely to go too far, than to stop short of its proper Object, is recommended to the *Examiner's* Consideration.

[illegible]

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